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Abstract 
 
Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) explores the role of discourse structures in 
constituting social inequality.  Metaphorical structure, however, has received relatively 
little attention in explicit CDA.  The paper aims to redress this by developing a coherent 
theoretical framework for CDA and metaphor.  This framework adopts conceptual 
blending theory over conceptual metaphor theory, where the latter is perceived to be 
incompatible with CDA.  The framework is applied in a CDA of metaphors for nation 
and immigration in the British National Party‟s 2005 general election manifesto.  
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1. Introduction 
 
For mainstream CDA, as Chilton (2005a: 21) states, “Halliday‟s systemic functional 
grammar has supposedly provided the toolkit for deconstructing the socially-constructed 
(and thus linguistically constructed) machinery of power”.  Properties of discourse to 
have received much attention include, for example, agentless passive constructions and 
nominalisations (Fairclough 1989; Fowler 1991; Fowler et al. 1979; Kress 1985; Kress 
and Hodge 1979).  Argumentation theory has also been drawn upon in CDA, highlighting 
various topoi, or standard arguments, which appear in racist discourse (van Dijk 2000; 
Wodak and Sedlak 2000).  Metaphor, on the other hand, has been largely neglected in 
mainstream CDA (cf. Chilton 2005a).  However, as Charteris-Black (2004: 28) states, 
“metaphor is . . . central to critical discourse analysis since it is concerned with forming a 
coherent view of reality”.  Where CDA (and Critical Linguistics in particular) has been 
concerned with ideological and mystifacatory structures of discourse, metaphor is just 
such a structure.  Hodge and Kress (1993: 15) contend that ideology involves “a 
systematically organised presentation of reality”.  Metaphors are ideological, then, in so 
far as they “define in significant part what one takes as reality” (Chilton and Lakoff 1995: 
56).  According to Chilton (1996: 74), metaphors “can contribute to a situation where 
they privilege one understanding of reality over others”.  Metaphors also play an 
important role with regard to both the interpersonal and the ideational function of 
language described by Halliday (1985).   
 
To analyse meaning reproduced through any discourse property requires a cognitive 
approach.  As Chilton (2005a: 23) states, discourse is 
 
produced and interpreted by human individuals interacting with one 
another...If language use (discourse) is, as the tenets of CDA assert, 
connected to the „construction‟ of knowledge about social objects, 
identities, processes, etc., then that construction can only be taking place in 
the minds of (interacting) individuals. 
 
In the sociocognitive approach of course, van Dijk has addressed the role of cognition.  
However, cognitive theories of meaning in discourse have been neglected by mainstream 
approaches to CDA, including the sociocognitive approach.  Indeed, Wodak (2006: 179) 
suggests that cognitive theories have been rejected and excluded from CDA by many 
scholars out of often unjustified reasons.  And Chilton (2005a: 21) states that Cognitive 
Linguistics, which is centrally concerned with meaning, has been eschewed by CDA and 
does not feature in the literature in any seriously comprehended way.   
 
Within the socio-cognitive approach to CDA, discourse and social structure are mediated 
by social cognition.  According to van Dijk (1993: 280): 
 
It is theoretically essential to understand that there is no other way to 
relate macrolevel notions such as group dominance and inequality with 
microlevel notions as text, talk, meaning and understanding.  Indeed, the 
crucial notion of reproduction, needed to explain how discourse plays a 
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role in the reproduction of dominance, presupposes an account that relates 
discourse structures to social cognitions, and social cognitions to social 
structures. 
 
Such a model may be diagrammatically represented as in figure 1, where the bidirectional 
arrows denote the dialectical relation between discourse and social structure and the 
shaded area indicates the microlevel focus of CDA: 
 
Figure 1.  Discourse-cognition-society triangle 
 
 
At the microlevel, Cognitive Linguistics provides an apparatus with which metaphor can 
be addressed in CDA.  In attending to metaphor in CDA, Cognitive Linguistics is indeed 
the perfect tool.  Broadly speaking, Cognitive Linguistics, like socio-cognitive CDA, 
explores the relation between language, cognition, and culture.  Furthermore, Cognitive 
Linguistics provides insights into the pervasiveness and persuasiveness of metaphor. 
 
Available for appropriation in CDA, two accounts of metaphor exist within Cognitive 
Linguistics: conceptual metaphor theory (Lakoff and Johnson 1981, 1999; Lakoff 1993) 
and the more recent conceptual blending theory (Fauconnier and Turner 2002).
2
  Whilst 
conceptual metaphor theory (CMT) and conceptual blending theory (BT) share much in 
common in their treatment of linguistic and conceptual structure, there are some subtle 
but important distinctions between them.  On the similarities and differences between the 
two theories, Grady et al. (1999: 101) assert: 
 
Both approaches treat metaphor as a conceptual rather than a purely 
linguistic phenomenon; both involve systematic projection of language, 
imagery and inferential structure between conceptual domains . . . 
However, there are also important differences between the approaches: 
CMT posits relationships between pairs of mental representations while 
[BT] allows for more than two; CMT has defined metaphor as a strictly 
directional phenomenon, while BT has not.     
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Within Cognitive Linguistics, CMT and BT have been treated as both complementary 
(Grady et al. 1999) and competing (Coulson 2000).  They shall be treated here as 
competing.  By far the most prominent, CMT has been applied outside (explicit) CDA in 
critical metaphor studies across a range of discourses (Beer and De Landtsheer 2004; 
Chilton 1996; Chilton and Lakoff 1995; Lakoff 1991, 1996, 2003; Santa Ana 2002).  
CMT and CDA, however, can be said to suffer a number of theoretical tensions or 
inconsistencies, which is not the case for BT and CDA.  Let us now turn to examine the 
compatibility problems between CMT and CDA, before outlining the alternative, BT.  
We may term them the problem of focus, the problem of motivation, and the problem of 
relation.  Whilst we may separate them for the purpose of illumination, it should be noted 
that they are closely intertwined.   
 
 
2. Conceptual metaphor theory and CDA:  Compatibility problems  
 
Problem of focus 
 
CMT is primarily concerned with the conceptual structures from which language is held 
to naturally arise.  Writing within a CMT framework, Santa Ana (2002: 29) states that:   
 
the cognitivist focus of attention is not on individual sentences.  The object 
is not any particular linguistic expression of metaphor, but the metaphoric 
mapping between two semantic domains. 
 
Consequently, the data CMT presents as evidence for conventionalised conceptual 
metaphors is often not attested but rather appeals to native speaker intuition.
3
  This is in 
contrast to CDA, where the focus is on microlevel analysis of concrete examples of 
discourse, which is to say, actual instances of talk or text in different genres.   
 
CMT is concerned with cross-domain mappings in „everyday‟ thought and language 
(Lakoff and Johnson 1980, 1999).  That is, with the way we represent apolitical domains 
such as time in conceptual and linguistic structure.
4
  CDA, on the other hand, is 
concerned with discourse on topics which explicitly fall within the social and political 
realm.  Here we may make a Saussurian distinction between language (langue) and 
discourse (parole), where langue refers to a language system and parole refers to the use 
of that system for communicative purposes.  Discourse, in line with Habermas, is often 
vested with interests.  Is metaphor, then, a matter of language or discourse?  Or as Chilton 
(1996: 65) enquires: 
 
Since the time of Aristotle, discussion of metaphor has oscillated between 
the cognitive perspective and the oratorical perspective.  Sometimes the 
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 5 
two perspectives have been merged.  Is metaphor a means of knowledge? . 
. . Or is it to do with persuasion and affect? 
 
Of course, metaphor may be a feature of both language and discourse.  A CDA 
perspective, however, requires a theory that allows for metaphor to be treated as 
discourse.
5
  Herein lays a major contradiction between CMT and CDA, for CMT tends 
only to focus on the cognitive dimensions of metaphor, maintaining that it is a matter of 
language and knowledge.
6
  BT, on the other hand, accounts for the cognitive operations 
involved in the discourse process and thus provides a more suitable apparatus for 
metaphor in CDA. 
 
Problem of motivation 
 
Intrinsically tied to CMT is the theory of experientialism or conceptual embodiment 
(Johnson 1987; Lakoff and Johnson 1980, 1999), which holds that our conceptual 
structure is directly grounded in the kind of bodies we have and the kind of experiences 
we have with them and the physical world we inhabit.   
 
For CMT, metaphors, which take the form of an asymmetrical mapping from a source 
domain onto a target domain, are not arbitrarily constructed.  On the contrary, the kinds 
of knowledge domains which feature as source domains and the kinds which feature as 
target domains follow a predictable pattern.  Source domains, Chilton (2005b: 6) states, 
“have a clear tendency to be based in human physiological experience”.  Target domains, 
on the other hand, “tend to be more abstract, understructured or problematic conceptual 
areas” (Chilton 2005b: 7).  Sensorimotor experiences are said to often provide source 
domains for subjective experiences.  Primary metaphors
7
 are motivated by universal co-
occurrences of these two different kinds of experience (Lakoff and Johnson 1999). 
 
CMT constitutes a theory of cognitive semantics, then, which explains the motivation for 
particular mappings as grounded in experientialist connections between domains, leaving 
no room for speaker intention.  According to Lakoff and Johnson (1999: 56), “primary 
metaphors are part of the cognitive unconscious”.  The experientialist commitment of 
CMT, however, causes theoretical tension with CDA, for which “metaphors are . . . 
chosen by speakers to achieve particular communication goals within particular contexts 
rather than being predetermined by bodily experience” (Charteris-Black 2004: 247).  If 
we consider, for example, the metaphorical conceptualisation in immigration discourse of 
the movement of people as the movement of water (Charteris-Black 2006; Santa Ana 
2002), we would not want to claim that this metaphor is grounded in experientialist 
connections between the domains of water and immigration but rather that the use of this 
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6
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non-primary metaphor is instead motivated by the rhetorical intentions of the speaker.  
For metaphor in CDA, therefore, a more pragmatic approach to metaphor is required: 
 
One of the limitations of metaphor analysis when the cognitive approach is 
isolated from the pragmatic one is that the only explanation of metaphor 
motivation is with reference to an underlying experiential basis.  This 
assumes that metaphor use is an unconscious reflex, whereas a pragmatic 
view argues that speakers use metaphor to persuade by combining the 
cognitive and linguistic resources at their disposal.  
(Charteris-Black 2004: 11) 
 
Whilst Charteris-Black (2004) attempts to resolve the problem of motivation by 
combining CMT with pragmatic theory, BT actually offers an inherently cognitive-
pragmatic approach to metaphor. 
 
Problem of relation 
 
The problem of relation refers to the opposing perceptions in CMT and CDA of the 
relation between linguistic representation and conceptual representation.  For CMT, 
linguistic metaphor is conceived of as the surface-level manifestation of underlying 
conceptual metaphor, as expressed by Lakoff (1993: 203):   
 
Metaphor . . . has come to mean „a cross-domain mapping in the 
conceptual system‟.  The term „metaphorical expression‟ refers to a 
linguistic expression (a word, phrase or sentence) that is the surface 
realisation of such a cross-domain mapping. 
 
In other words, metaphorical expression emerges from mappings at the conceptual level.  
Consequently, conceptual structure is merely reflected in linguistic structure.   
 
The root of (primary) metaphor according to CMT, then, is conceptual structure, which in 
turn, is grounded in pre-linguistic bodily experience.  In this sense, for CMT, linguistic 
representation is a product of conceptual representation.  This view, however, is 
inconsonant with CDA, which would maintain the inverse; that linguistic representation 
in discourse can determine, to some extent, conceptual representation.  Importantly for 
metaphor in CDA, then, a theory is required in which the root of metaphor (in discourse 
on social and political topics) may be treated as grounded in discourse.  Resonating with 
this perspective, metaphor in BT originates in discourse and then may become embedded 
at the conceptual level.   
 
A number of compatibility problems between CMT and the CDA perspective have been 
identified whilst BT, it has been suggested, offers an analytic apparatus more congruent 
with CDA.  Let us now, then, offer an outline of BT. 
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3. Conceptual blending theory 
 
In contrast to CMT, BT is a theory of online meaning construction.  It accounts for some 
of the conceptual operations performed during discourse.  BT is founded upon its 
precursor, mental space theory (Fauconnier 1994, 1997).  In mental space theory, words 
do not refer directly to entities in the world but rather prompt for the construction of 
mental spaces, which contain certain elements.  According to Fauconnier and Turner 
(1996: 113):  
 
Mental spaces are small conceptual packets constructed as we think and 
talk, for purposes of local understanding and action.  They are 
interconnected, and can be modified as thought and discourse unfold.  
 
Elements in a mental space are, inter alia, the entities, objects, actions, and processes 
referred to explicitly or implicitly in discourse.  In any stretch of discourse, a number of 
interconnected mental spaces may be constructed, where “linguistic expressions will 
typically establish new spaces, elements within them, and relations holding between the 
elements” (Fauconnier 1994: 17).     
 
Amongst other phenomena such as reference and metonymy, metaphor is one particular 
kind of linguistic expression which prompts for the construction of a number of mental 
spaces.  In the case of metaphor, mental spaces constructed during discourse undergo a 
specific conceptual blending operation
8
 whereby they are manipulated in an integrated 
network, producing inferential structure.  Unlike CMT, in which a mapping occurs across 
two semantic domains, BT treats metaphor as a conceptual projection involving four 
mental spaces.   
 
BT adopts a particular diagrammatic notation based in mathematical set theory to 
represent conceptual blending patterns.  The „basic diagram‟ is reproduced below, 
adapted from Fauconnier and Turner (2002: 46): 
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Figure 2.  Conceptual blending basic diagram 
 
 
 
In figure 2 above, the basic diagram of a conceptual blending network, mental spaces are 
represented by the four large circles.  Elements within mental spaces are represented by 
the points inside the circles.  Whilst this diagram is a „static‟ illustration of the conceptual 
blending operation, it is important to recognise, as Fauconnier and Turner (2002: 46) 
stress, that “such a diagram is really just a snapshot of an imaginative and complicated 
process”.  
 
Input spaces 
 
Blends arise in networks of mental spaces.  The basic blending network consists of four 
mental spaces: two input spaces, a generic space, and the blended space.
9
  According to 
Coulson (2000: 23), “a new space is . . . set up when utterances concern objects or events 
that require different background assumptions”.  Metaphorical utterances in discourse are 
of precisely this kind; they involve spaces which contain elements belonging to two 
different (potential) scenarios with different background frames or assumptions.  As 
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 9 
metaphorical discourse unfolds, then, a space is created for each scenario.  These spaces 
are input space1 and input space2 respectively.   In conceptual integration, the two input 
spaces share counterpart connections between elements, represented in the diagram by 
the solid lines.  Counterpart connections can be of many different kinds, generally 
referred to as vital relations.  Fauconnier and Turner (2002: 89-111) identify a number of 
vital relations including identity, role, intentionality, time, space, and category.  The 
dashed lines connecting the elements inside the four spaces represent conceptual 
projections across the network.  These connective lines correspond to neural 
coactivations and bindings (Fauconnier and Turner 2002: 46).  
 
Generic space 
 
In addition to the two input spaces, there is the generic space.  The generic space contains 
abstract structure which is common to the counterpart elements in both of the input 
spaces.  In other words, “at any moment in the construction of the network, the structure 
that inputs seem to share is captured in a generic space” (Fauconnier and Turner 2002: 
47).  In turn, elements in the generic space project onto the counterpart elements in the 
input spaces.  We can think of structure in the generic space in terms of thematic roles, 
categories which structure the linguistic representation in discourse of a given scenario.  
For example, with regard to who did what to whom where and how.  
 
Blended space 
 
Finally, the fourth space, the blended space, is arrived at via conceptual blending 
operations.  It receives structure from both the input spaces.  In blending, “structure from 
two input mental spaces is projected to a new space, the blend” (Fauconnier and Turner 
2002: 47).   The blended space also receives structure from the generic space.  “Generic 
spaces and blended spaces are related: blends contain generic structure captured in the 
generic space” (Fauconnier and Turner 2002: 47).   
 
Emergent structure 
 
The most important thing to note in the basic diagram is the box inside the blended space, 
which represents emergent structure. 
   
In blending, structure from two input spaces is projected to a separate 
space, the „blend‟.  The blend inherits partial structure from the input 
spaces, and has emergent structure of its own.  
(Fauconnier and Turner 1996: 113) 
 
Emergent structure is structure unique to the blend.  That is, the blended space contains 
structure which is not copied there directly from the input spaces but which rather is a 
product of blending operations.  Emergent structure is generated by three blending 
processes: composition; completion; elaboration.  
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Composition 
 
Through composition, the projections in the blending network create new relations in the 
blended space.  In Fauconnier and Turner‟s (2002: 48) words, “blending can compose 
elements from the input spaces to provide relations that do not exist in the separate 
inputs”.  Counterpart elements can be composed to produce two separate elements in the 
blended space.  However, in the case of metaphor, a special kind of composition occurs, 
referred to as fusion.  Here, counterpart elements in the input spaces get projected into the 
blended space, creating a single compound element.
10
  It is important to note that the 
relation, or topology, between counterpart elements is maintained in the blend.   
 
Completion 
    
Completion occurs as relevant structure from background knowledge associated with the 
elements in the input spaces is recruited into the blend.  Such background knowledge may 
take the form of contextual information or conceptual frames, for example.  According to 
Fauconnier and Turner (2002: 48):  
 
We rarely realise the extent of background knowledge and structure that 
we bring into a blend unconsciously.  Blends recruit great ranges of such 
meaning . . . We see some parts of a familiar frame of meaning, and much 
more of the frame is recruited silently but effectively to the blend.     
 
A conceptual frame is a cognitive-based, stable but modifiable knowledge structure for 
given scenes or scenarios stored in long-term memory.
11
  According to Fillmore (1985: 
224), “a frame represents the particular organisation of knowledge which stands as a 
prerequisite to our ability to understand the meanings of . . . associated words”.  It is in 
this sense, then, that “mental spaces operate in working memory but are built up partly by 
activating structures available from long-term memory” (Fauconnier and Turner 2002: 
102).  Frames are activated by discourse and at the same time provide background 
information which gives meaning to discourse.  In BT terms, elements in input spaces 
activate the wider conceptual frames to which they belong, relevant structure from which 
may in turn be recruited into the blended space via the process of completion.  It should 
be noted that not all available structure from conceptual frames necessarily gets projected 
into the blended space, only that which is relevant to the speaker‟s intention in 
constructing the blend.  This is known as selective projection and is guided by normal 
pragmatic constraints.   
 
Selective projection in conceptual blending further contributes to the ideology of 
metaphor.  Elements available for recruitment may not get projected into the blended 
space.  Where selective projection in conceptual blending networks is a pragmatic 
phenomenon, integration networks are constructed according to speakers‟ communicative 
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(and rhetorical) intentions.  In other words, ideologically, speakers may choose to recruit 
particular structure in order to promote a certain perceived reality.
12
   
 
Elaboration and the blended space 
 
Elaboration is the most significant stage in the blending process.
13
  It is the „running of 
the blend‟.  Fauconnier (1997: 151) states that elaboration “consists in cognitive work 
performed within the blend, according to its own emergent logic”.  Herein lays the 
importance of conceptual blending for CDA.  As a function of emergent structure in the 
blended space, metaphor is „cognitively real‟.  Moreover, metaphor in discourse thus has 
absolute consequences for further cognitive processes:  “blended spaces are sites for 
central cognitive work: reasoning . . ., drawing inferences . . ., and developing emotions” 
(Fauconnier and Turner 1996: 115).   
 
 
4. Conceptual blending theory and CDA 
 
Socio-cognitive CDA maintains that discourse occurs in short-term memory (STM) 
against knowledge stored in long-term memory (LTM) (van Dijk 2002).  Similarly, 
conceptual blending is a cognitive operation performed in STM, or working memory, 
online as discourse unfolds, against structures in LTM such as conceptual frames, 
elements from which may be recruited in the blending process.  Blending networks 
themselves, though, can become embedded in LTM through a process of entrenchment: 
 
Mental spaces are built up dynamically in working memory, but they can 
also become entrenched in long-term memory . . . entrenchment is a 
general possibility not just for individual mental spaces but for networks 
of spaces.  In particular, integration networks built up dynamically can 
become entrenched and available to be activated all at once.  
  (Fauconnier and Turner 2002: 103) 
 
Within the socio-cognitive framework, LTM is further broken down into episodic and 
semantic (or social) memory (van Dijk 2002).   Social cognitions, which are social 
“because they are shared and presupposed by group members” (van Dijk 1993: 257), 
reside in semantic memory.  Entrenched blends will likewise comprise part of semantic 
memory, given their socially shared nature: 
 
Blends themselves can also become entrenched . . . giving rise to 
conceptual and formal structures shared throughout the community.
14
 
(Fauconnier and Turner 2002: 49)   
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Since social cognition is defined as “the system of mental representations and processes 
of group members” (van Dijk 1995: 18), we may characterise entrenched blends as social 
cognitions in one particular form.  Entrenched conceptual blending networks are 
precisely mental representations and processes of group members.  Furthermore, where 
social inequality is facilitated through the reproduction of social cognition, entrenchment 
is reproduction.  Accordingly, where the relation between discourse, cognition and social 
structure may be diagrammatically represented as in figure 1, we may offer a 
corresponding model specifically for metaphor in CDA as follows in figure 3:  
 
Figure 3.  Metaphor in the discourse-cognition-society triangle 
 
 
In contrast to CMT, then, BT is entirely resonant with the dialectical relation perceived 
by CDA between discourse and social structure.  As discourse can be constitutive of 
social structure, mediated by social cognition, so metaphor in discourse can be 
constitutive of social structure, mediated by entrenched conceptual blends.  
 
Not all blending networks, though, are or become entrenched.  So the questions then arise 
- Which blending networks are entrenched and what is the evidence that these blending 
networks are entrenched?  To answers these questions we must draw on several different 
concepts of discourse.  Hopefully, this will also enable us to reconcile the social-
constructivist perspective of CDA with the cognitive-individualism of BT. 
 
So far, we have tended to use the term discourse in the concrete sense that it is 
traditionally used in linguistics – to refer to particular instances of talk or text situated in 
time and place.
15
  However, Foucault uses discourse more abstractly to refer to “a 
regulated practice that accounts for a number of statements” (1972: 80).  It is this concept 
of discourse which inspires Kress‟ (1985: 6-7), when he states: "a discourse provides a 
set of possible statements about a given area, and organises and gives structure to the 
manner in which a particular topic, object, process is to be talked about."   Foucault 
alternatively uses the terms in a collective sense to refer to “an individualisable group of 
statements” (1972: 80).  Inspired by this definition, Fairclough applies the concept of 
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order of discourse, where “the order of discourse of some social domain is the totality of 
its discursive practices” (Fairclough 1995: 132).   
 
The important point here is the relation between these concepts of discourse.  Discourse 
(abstract) dictates the nature of discourse (concrete) and therefore discourses (collective), 
where a discourse (collective) is the sum of discourse (concrete).  But at the same time, it 
is from discourse (concrete) and discourses (collective) that discourses (abstract) come in 
to being.  Of course, according to CDA‟s macrolevel social critique, it is from elite 
discourse (concrete) and discourses (collective) that discourses (abstract) arise.   
 
How, then, do metaphors and the conceptual blending patterns they prompt for fit within 
this system?  Metaphors, which occur in discourse (concrete), can be more or less 
conventional.  When a particular metaphor is used conventionally we can say that it 
consists as part of a discourse (collective).  Conventional uses of metaphor reflect 
entrenched conceptual blending networks.  With this statement we must be careful not to 
think that the problem of relation must also apply here.  Synchronically, current 
conventional uses of metaphor reflect entrenched conceptual blending patterns.  But 
conventionalisation is of course a diachronic sociolinguistic process.  Diachronically, 
conventional uses of metaphor give rise to entrenched conceptual blending patterns. 
Entrenched conceptual blending networks, then, are discourses (abstract).  It is not 
inconsistent to characterise entrenched conceptual blending patterns as both social 
cognitions and discourses (abstract), where according to Weiss and Wodak ( 2003: 13)   
“the discourse-historical approach [to CDA] elaborates and links to the sociocognitive 
theory of van Dijk . . . and views „discourse‟ as a form of knowledge and memory”.   
 
After a highly theoretical discussion, let us now see how the framework developed here 
may be applied.  For the purpose of illustration, we will examine the metaphorical 
constructions of nation, immigration and immigrants in a genre where persuasion is 
certainly a major communicative goal of the speaker, the election manifesto (Charteris-
Black 2004).  More specifically, part of the 2005 general election manifesto of the British 
National Party (BNP) will be the subject of investigation.
16
  Whilst the BNP are a fringe 
party located on the extreme right of the political spectrum, recently they have enjoyed 
unprecedented media attention and have achieved record results in both general and local 
elections.  In the 2005 general election, they won a total of 192,746 votes, an increase of 
over 300% on their performance in the previous 2001 election.  In the 2006 local 
elections, the BNP more than doubled its number of councillors, increasing the number 
from 20 to 52.
17
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5. Metaphor and blending in right-wing discourse 
 
CDA views discourse structures as linguistic representation formulated in order to 
achieve certain strategies.
18
  Referential and evaluative strategies have been identified as 
particularly important in racist discourse.  Referential strategies are used in discourse to 
represent/construct social actors (participants) in a given scenario.  Typically, this 
involves the construction and polarisation of an in-group versus an out-group.  Such a 
strategy is achieved linguistically through categorization, for example, in the form of 
ethnonyms and toponyms.  However, it is also achievable with the use of metaphor.  
Presupposing a referential strategy, an evaluative strategy is manifested in the negative 
representation of the out-group.  Evaluative strategies may be achieved with various 
standard arguments, for example, the topoi of danger, number, or displacement (Wodak 
and Sedlak 2000: 233).  Metaphor also can function as a standard argument realising an 
evaluative strategy.   
 
In the opening paragraph of the BNP text, immigration is presented metaphorically as a 
threat.  Furthermore, a metonymy is constructed in which immigration and terrorism are 
linked.  This construction is an example of the topos of danger:  
 
Paragraph 1 
Britain‟s very existence today is threatened by immigration.  As a nation we 
must rebuild trust in the immigration system amongst the British electorate whilst 
simultaneously ensuring that National Security is maintained in the era of global 
terrorism.     
 
In paragraph 2, the movement of people is presented metaphorically as a „flood of asylum 
seekers‟: 
 
 Paragraph 2 
If Tony Blair can say that it is “neither racist nor extremist” to raise “genuine 
concerns” about the flood of asylum seekers, then it is no longer feasible to 
pretend the crisis doesn‟t exist.   
 
This metaphorical structure clearly realises an evaluative strategy with a topos of danger.  
The use of „flood‟ may also be considered a topos of number, where a flood involves 
particularly large quantities of water.  According to Wodak and Sedlak (2000: 233): 
 
Immigrants or refugees are typically said to come in large numbers, which 
results in the conclusion that immigration must be reduced or even 
stopped.  An argumentation schema like this one is defined as topos of 
number. 
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 Note that strategy here refers to speaker strategy.  If we adopt CMT, due to the problem of motivation, it 
is not possible to conceive of metaphor as serving a strategic function. 
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If we consider how a blending network for „flood of asylum seekers‟ might be 
constructed, as in figure 4, further ideological consequences of this construction can be 
observed. 
 
Figure 4.  Conceptual blending network for ‘flood of asylum seekers’ 
 
 
 
Here, prompted by “flood” and “asylum seekers”, two mental spaces are constructed 
which enter into a conceptual integration network.  Emergent structure arises in the 
blended space in which the two counter-part elements in each input space are fused 
through composition.  The blending process, then, produces emergent structure in which 
the migration of people is conceptualised as a flood of water.  Notice here that a flood is 
an event whereas migration is a (demographic) process.  Events and processes are closely 
related, where events are often the consequence of processes.  This relation is captured in 
the generic space.  In the blended space, emergent structure arises in which immigration 
is conceptualised as an ongoing event, or an event-process.  This conceptualisation is 
only possible through the juxtaposition of the two input spaces, and cannot be accounted 
for by the asymmetrical mapping in the CMT model.  Importantly, the kinds of action one 
is likely to take during a flood is different to that which one would take after the event. 
The conceptualisation of an ongoing „flood of asylum seekers‟ immediately warrants the 
implementation of restrictive immigration policy in order to stop the „flood‟. 
 
Theme 
Event-Process 
People 
Migration 
Water 
Flood 
Water-People 
Flood-Migration 
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Whilst the themes water and people are both entities of some kind, they are different 
kinds of entities.  Note that part of knowledge stored in the conceptual frame for water, 
activated by the water element in input space1, includes the fact that it is a mass noun 
such that the movement of water is conceptualised as the movement of a single entity.  
When projected into the blended space, this knowledge will produce emergent structure 
in which the migration of people is also conceptualised as a single moving entity.  The 
configuration of such a network has a number of significant consequences after 
elaboration.  The migration of people conceptualised as a single moving entity masks the 
plight of individual immigrants.  It carries the inference that immigration is a simple 
phenomenon and makes available the inference that all cases may be treated in the same 
way.  On the ideology of examples such as these, Santa Ana (2002: 72) states:    
 
To characterise the movement of people as moving water might seem 
quite natural, but such a formulation of movement of people is not the 
only possible image that can be employed. 
 
Also ideologically, notice that structure available for recruitment from the general water 
frame, such as its importance in sustaining life, does not get projected into the blended 
space. 
  
In a similar example, immigration is not presented as a „flood of water‟ but less intensely 
as a „flow of water‟: 
 
Paragraph 19 
A BNP government would accept no further immigration from any of the parts of 
the world which present the prospect of an almost limitless flow of immigration. 
 
This metaphor will give rise to much of the same inferential structure as the previous 
example, derived from the conceptual frame for water.  This example is particularly 
interesting, though, when one considers it in conjunction with a preceding metaphor in 
which Britain is conceptualised as a container: 
 
Paragraph 15 
Britain is full up and the government of Britain has as its first responsibility the 
welfare, security and long-term preservation of the native people of Britain.  
 
The cohesive interaction of these two metaphors may produce a blending network as 
below in figure 5.  Emergent structure arises in the blended space in which the three 
counter-part elements in each input space are fused through composition.  The blending 
process, then, produces emergent structure in which the nation is conceptualised as a 
container and the migration of people as the flowing of water into the container.  Stored 
in one‟s conceptual frame for containers is the fact that they have a limited capacity.  
Where hearers are prompted to conceptualise immigration to Britain as the flowing of 
water into a container already at its capacity, elaboration of such a network makes 
available the inference that Britain could „overflow‟, an inference which again 
immediately justifies restrictive immigration policy.  
 17 
Figure 5.  Conceptual blending network for interaction of ‘flow of immigration’ and    
         ‘Britain is full up’ 
 
 
 
Notice also in the example from paragraph 15 the phrase “long-term preservation of the 
native people of Britain”.  Against a blending network such as that in figure 5, this 
construction may be realising a topos of displacement, promoting the image of the native 
British population becoming „diluted‟ by immigration. 
 
An alternative construction of the nation which is particularly significant in immigration 
discourse involves metaphors whereby the nation is conceptualised as a house (Chilton 
1994).  Consider the following examples: 
 
Paragraph 7 
Every nation, no matter how open or closed its immigration policy may be, has 
the right and duty to maintain sovereign physical control of its borders. 
 
Paragraph 19 
Our first step will be to shut the door.   
 
When these two metaphors interact cohesively, a blending network such as follows in 
figure 6 may arise. 
Topic 
Theme 
Process 
Britain 
People 
Migrate 
Container 
Water 
Flow 
Container-Britain 
Water-People 
Flow-Migrate 
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In this blending network, emergent structure arises in the blended space where the 
counter-part elements of house and nation converge.  Immigration policy and door also 
become fused.  And to shut the door becomes fused with implementing restrictive 
immigration policy, both actions as captured in the generic space. 
 
Figure 6.  Conceptual blending network for interaction of ‘open or closed its immigration  
     policy’ and ‘shut the door’ 
 
 
 
Now, part of knowledge stored in the conceptual frame for house is that it is a private 
dwelling, entry into which is only at the permission of the resident.  Within the blended 
space of this integration network, then, the nation is conceptualised as a private property, 
where policy makers have the right to refuse entry to certain individuals.  Recalling that 
the blended space is not only the site of reasoning but also for developing emotions, 
elaboration of a network where house and nation provide counter-part elements may elicit 
emotional responses that have to do with violation of personal space.  This is especially 
reinforced in the following example: 
 
Paragraph 7 
We . . . shall continue to increase budget and personnel until our borders are 
secure against significant intrusion.   
 
Topic 
Patient 
Action 
Britain 
Policy 
Implement 
restrictive policy 
House 
Door 
Shut 
House-Britain 
Door-Policy 
Shut-Implement restrictive policy 
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Abstractable from any kind of container, including a house, is a container schema.  Image 
schemas are dynamic cognitive constructs which “represent schematic patterns arising 
from imagistic domains” (Croft and Cruse 2004: 44).  The container schema has been 
observed to feature in the metaphorical construction of the nation across various 
discourses, including immigration discourse (Charteris-Black 2006; Chilton 1994).   
 
A container schema has an inherent „logic‟ or topology consisting of three salient 
structures: an interior and exterior defined by a boundary.  In immigration discourse, this 
structure can get projected into the blended space, giving rise to emergent structure in 
which the nation is conceptualised with the same topology.  The container schema affords 
two perspectives: vantage-point-interior and vantage-point-exterior.  As a function both 
of the topology of the container schema and the vantage-point-interior perspective always 
adopted in immigration discourse, the container schema denotes insiders versus outsiders.  
Consequently, any metaphor in immigration discourse involving a container may realise a 
referential strategy.
19
 
 
  
6.   Conclusion: Further constructing the theoretical framework 
 
This paper has attempted to develop a theoretical framework by which metaphor may be 
addressed in explicit CDA.  Conceptual blending theory rather than conceptual metaphor 
theory has provided the apparatus for microlevel analysis.  Where entrenchment is the 
reproduction of social cognition in one form, conceptual blending theory has been shown 
to fit within the socio-cognitive approach to CDA in particular.  This framework has then 
been applied in a qualitative analysis of metaphor in a single text.  However, since 
entrenchment depends in part on conventionality of usage, a complete and lucid 
framework requires quantitative analysis across different discourse genres in order to 
determine which metaphors are used conventionally in a given discourse and, by 
implication, which blending networks are most likely to be(come) entrenched.   
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 Appropriating Chilton‟s (2004) discourse space theory in which referents are conceptualised as located in 
a discourse space consisting of three intersecting axes, Hart (2006) demonstrates that metaphors in 
immigration discourse where a container and nation provide counter-part elements in an integration 
network may realise an evaluative strategy as a function of the „distance‟ at which they prompt for the out-
group to be positioned along the modal (or evaluative) axis. 
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